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FOREWORD
THE THIRD ANNUAL FRITZ B. BURNS
LECTURE ON RULE 11 REFORM: PROGRESS
OR RETREAT ON ATTORNEY SANCTIONS?
Daniel E. Lazaroff*
On April 8, 1994, the Fritz B. Burns Foundation and Loyola Law
School sponsored a public lecture addressing significant recent
amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
garding sanctions for frivolous litigation.' The principal speakers at
this event were the Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior Judge in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia and Director of the Federal Judicial Center, and Professor Ge-
orgene M. Vairo, Associate Dean of Fordham University School of
Law. Both speakers have now prepared articles articulating their re-
spective views regarding the new Rule 11.2
The now-discarded 1983 version of Rule 11 made sanctions
mandatory when lawyers failed to satisfy an objective standard of rea-
sonable inquiry into the facts or law underlying a claim.3 This ap-
proach to sanctions represented a dramatic departure from the
original 1937 version of Rule 11, pursuant to which sanctions could
only be triggered by intentional or willful misconduct.4 The 1983
amendments represented an effort to streamline the federal litigation
process and unclog an increasingly jammed civil justice system.
While the 1983 version of Rule 11 appeared sensible on its face
and had potential for alleviating some of the perceived abuses in the
* Professor of Law and Cohen Chair in Law and Economics, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles; B.A., 1971, State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D., 1974, New York
University.
1. On December 1, 1993, extensive amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure went into effect. This included a major revision of the 1983 version of Rule 11. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-
printed in 146 F.R.D. 401, 419-24 (1993).
2. See William W Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 7
(1994); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Past As Prologue, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 39 (1994).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 197 (1983).
4. For discussions of the original version of Rule 11, see Robert L. Carter, The History
arid Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 4,4-9 (1985); Edward D. Cavanagh, Devel-
oping Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 499, 503-06 (1986).
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federal courts, judicial application of the Rule precipitated considera-
ble commentary and criticism. The most frequent complaints included
concerns that the 1983 version of Rule 11 chilled creative advocacy,
particularly in the area of public interest litigation.' Further, critics
noted that the Rule spawned time-consuming satellite litigation,6 cre-
ated improper fee shifting,7 and contributed to a rising tide of incivil-
ity and acrimony among lawyers and between bench and bar.8 In
short, many argued that the cure was far worse than the disease.
The December 1993 amendments to Rule 11 represented a major
effort to address the foregoing concerns about the harshness and dele-
terious impact of the 1983 rule. For example, the new Rule 11 makes
sanctions for violation of its provisions discretionary rather than
mandatory.9 In addition, the Rule now contains a "safe harbor" pro-
5. See Edward Greer, Rule 11: Substantive Bias in Formal Uniformity After the
Supreme Court Trilogy, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 111, 117-25 (1991); Arthur B. LaFrance,
Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 331, 333-34 (1988);
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust Litigation, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1033, 1043-54
(1993); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTnNGS LJ. 383, 393-94 (1990); Melissa L.
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. LJ. 1313, 1338-52 (1986); Ken-
neth F. Ripple & Gary J. Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 788, 788-89 (1988); Morton Stavis, Rule 11: Which is Worse-The Problem or the
Cure?, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 597, 606-08 (1992); Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and
Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 393, 413-14
(1991); Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429,
429 (1992); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105,
106-27 (1991); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 485, 489-
508 (1988-89); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 483-86 (1991); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis,
118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988).
6. See George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61 Miss. L.J. 5, 6, 13-14,
17 (1991); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575, 636-38 (1987); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11
Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1017-18 (1988).
7. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1947 (1989); Judge Sam D. Johnson et al.,
The Proposed Amendments to Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested Solutions, 43 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 647, 656 (1991).
8. See Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123
F.R.D. 361, 365-66 (1988); Glen N. Lenhoff, Some Negative Aspects of Rule 11, 67 MicH.
B.J. 522, 523 (1988); Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of
Litigation Defeat the Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Friv-
olous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309, 309-10 & n.3 (1990).
9. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 421 (1993).
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vision to permit withdrawal from unsupportable positions and also de-
emphasizes reliance on monetary sanctions. 10
The critical question is whether the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
will strike an acceptable balance between the need of the federal
courts to be free from wasteful, frivolous, or vexatious litigation and
the obligation of attorneys to represent their clients vigorously and
imaginatively without fear of reprisal. It is fair to conclude that Judge
Schwarzer is far more optimistic about the potential benefits of the
1993 amendments than Dean Vairo.
Judge Schwarzer recognizes that the 1993 amendments were in-
tended to address serious concerns regarding the 1983 version of Rule
11.11 Nevertheless, he asserts that the recent changes build on the
laudable initiative reflected in the 1983 Rule-regulating lawyers' be-
havior and promoting the enforcement of professional obligations.'"
The Judge emphasizes that Rule 11 must be read in pari materia with
the new Rule 26 regarding mandatory prediscovery disclosure.' 3 He
suggests that the interplay between these mutually reinforcing rules
heightens the professional obligations of lawyers in furtherance of the
overall aims of the federal rules.14 In sum, Judge Schwarzer appears
optimistic that Rule 11, together with other recent amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will promote and enhance profes-
sional behavior by advocates in the federal courts.
In rather sharp contrast, Dean Vairo is far less sanguine about the
benefits to be derived from the new Rule 11. Although she acknowl-
edges that the recent changes are a "step in the right direction" from
the perspective of Rule 11 critics,' 5 Dean Vairo remains concerned
about lingering conceptual and practical difficulties associated with
the revised rule.' 6 In fact, Dean Vairo seems unconvinced that the
revised rule will adequately address concerns such as chilling effects
and the deterioration of the attorney-client relationship.' 7 The poten-
10. Id. at 421-23; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587-88
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 advisory committee's notes] (discussing variety of possible sanc-
tions that court has available).
11. Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 12-13.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id. at 17-19.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Vairo, supra note 2, at 41.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 42-56.
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tial for continued satellite litigation and fee shifting also troubles
Dean Vairo.' s
While Judge Schwarzer emphasizes the potential benefit of the
new Rule 11 in promoting heightened professionalism," Dean Vairo
is more concerned that the independence of lawyers will continue to
be threatened.2 That is, the emphasis on the "officer of the court"
aspect of lawyering may unduly constrain attorneys in the proper rep-
resentation of their clients.2' While being careful not to suggest that
the United States' legal system is the equivalent of the German system
under the Nazi regime, Dean Vairo does refer to the German experi-
ence and focuses on the loss of the independence of lawyers as a con-
tributing factor.' In sum, while Dean Vairo views the 1993
amendments as a positive step, she still fears that the threat of huge
fee awards as sanctions will threaten vigorous advocacy.
My own view of the developments reflected in the 1993 amend-
ments stakes out a position that can best be described as "in between"
the ideas expressed by Judge Schwarzer and Dean Vairo. While I do
not fear that Rule 11 will destroy the independence of the practicing
bar and lead to anything remotely resembling a fascist regime in the
United States, there may still be significant problems associated with
the new Rule.
To be sure, the 1993 amendments do reflect much needed im-
provement. The decision to make sanctions for Rule 11 violations dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory was a bold move that could reduce
the chilling and fee-shifting effects associated with the 1983 version.
The apparent rejection of a continuing duty approach is also a positive
development, and the attempt to place greater emphasis on deter-
rence rather than fee shifting is laudable. It is also significant that the
Committee Notes now emphasize that legal theories predicated upon
minority opinions or views expressed in law review articles may be
protected from assertions of frivolousnessP
Nevertheless, several potential problems loom on the horizon.
The potential expansion of liability for represented parties may in-
crease attorney-client friction and create conflict of interest problems.
The retention of attorneys' fees as an option for trial judges could still
18. Id. at 67, 78.
19. Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 23.
20. Vairo, supra note 2, at 42-50.
21. Id. at 44.
22. Id. at 43-46.
23. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 10, at 587.
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result in fee shifting under the guise of deterrence. Most importantly,
the retention of an abuse of discretion standard for appellate review
may permit district judges too much leeway in deciding whether a vio-
lation has occurred and the nature of a sufficient sanction. Any deter-
mination regarding the validity of these concerns must await the
development of a body of new Rule 11 jurisprudence.24 Hopefully,
federal courts will seek to implement the new Rule in a manner that
accurately reflects the intent of the drafters to permit imaginative and
vigorous advocacy.
24. In one recent appellate decision, the First Circuit recognized the potential impact
of the new Rule 11. In Silva v. Witschen, 19 F.3d 725 (1st Cir. 1994), the court of appeals
applied the 1983 version of the Rule but noted in dicta that the 1993 amendments were
designed to make sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory and to emphasize deter-
rence rather than compensation or punishment. Id. at 729 n.5. If other courts take proper
cognizance of these important changes, perhaps the 1993 version of the Rule will eliminate
the most egregious problems associated with its predecessor.
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